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Abstract: The issue of whether or not there are visual arguments has been an issue in
informal logic and argumentation theory at least since 1996. In recent years, books,
sections of prominent conferences and special journals issues have been devoted to it,
thus significantly raising the profile of the debate. In this paper I will attempt to show
how the views of the later Wittgenstein, particularly his views on images and the no-
tion of “picturing”, can be brought to bear on the question of whether there are such
things as “purely visual” arguments. I shall draw on Wittgenstein’s remarks in the
Blue and Brown Books and in Philosophical Investigations in order to argue that al-
though visual images may occur as elements of argumentation, broadly conceived, it is
a mistake to think that there are purely visual arguments, in the sense of illative moves
from premises to conclusions that are conveyed by images alone, without the support
or framing of words.
Keywords: visual argument, Wittgenstein, pictures, Groarke, Slade.
Resumen: El tema de si acaso hay argumentación visual ha sido un tema en lógica
informal y teoría de la argumentación que ha estado presente al menos desde 1996. En
años recientes, libros, revistas, secciones en importantes conferencias y números es-
peciales en revistas han dedicado atención especial, creciendo de esta forma significa-
tivamente el perfil del debate. En este trabajo intentaré mostrar cómo la perspectiva
del Wittgenstein tardío, particularmente su visión respecto de imágenes y la noción de
“pintura”, puede enmarcar la pregunta respecto de si hay tales cosas como “argumen-
tación visual pura”. Pondré atención en los énfasis de Wittgenstein en los Cuadernos
Azul y Marrón, y en las Investigaciones filosóficas, para defender que aunque los ar-
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gumentos visuales pueden ser parte de elementos de una argumentación, concebido
de forma amplia, es un error pensar en la existencia de argumentos visuales puros, en
el sentido de movimientos ilativos desde premisas a conclusiones que son promovidos
por imágenes a solas, sin apoyo o enmarque de palabras.
Palabras clave: argumentación visual, Wittgenstein, pinturas, Groarke, Slade.
1. Introduction
“Pictures” and “picturing” are among the most prevalent and re-occurring
ideas in the Wittgensteinian corpus. Central to the account of meaning and
understanding in the Tractatus, these notions become instrumental for criti-
cism of that same theory in later works, particularly the Notebooks and in
the Philosophical Investigations. Of course, in many places in these works,
Wittgenstein intends to build an argument from analogy from the case with
pictures to the case with words that undoes his very different analogy between
the same things in the Tractatus. Whether we ought to accept Wittgenstein’s
analogy between pictures and language in either work is a question that
goes beyond the present purposes of this article. Here I will be concerned
only to draw on Wittgenstein’s meditations on pictures and picturing in these
latter works in an attempt to address the controversy over whether or not it
is plausible to think that there exists such a thing as purely visual argumenta-
tion. As a preliminary to my answer to this question, it will be necessary to
address some of the themes and passages central to the later Wittgensteinian
notion of pictures and picturing. I will begin with this task. For ease of ex-
position in this matter I will focus on some of the more prominent of
Wittgenstein’s remarks on pictures and picturing in the Notebooks and Philo-
sophical Investigations. While these two works shall be my primary sources,
those familiar with the Wittgensteinian corpus will recognize the influence
of other of Wittgenstein’s later works as well. Before I proceed to the body
of the paper I should offer one qualification of its purpose.
My intention here is to imagine a rough account of the nature and limits of
“visual argumentation” using the motif of pictures in the later Wittgenstein’s
work as a jumping-off point. I make no pretense that this thesis should be
taken as definitive on this topic. My reasons for this qualification of my the-
sis are three. First of all, to make such a claim would be out of step with the
spirit of Wittgenstein’s later works, where time and again he proceeds cau-
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tiously and with attention to alternative possibilities. I believe it wise to fol-
low his example here. Secondly, Wittgenstein, like many great philosophers,
writes in a way that makes particular demands of those who would inter-
pret his labyrinthine and at times genuinely puzzling works. Though I be-
lieve my interpretations to be sound, they are of course open to challenge
and controversy. To downplay that possibility would be to assume more
warrant for my conclusions than that to which they (hopefully) are entitled.
Thirdly, and finally, it is salutary to bear in mind that this account is limited
in that its principal considerations are drawn only from reflections on
Wittgenstein’s remarks. Even supposing that these reflections are accurate
and my arguments about them are sound, simply because Wittgenstein says
something does not make it true. That said, Wittgenstein’s having said as
much as he did about pictures and their relationship to language and un-
derstanding does make it worth our serious consideration. Few thinkers
have reflected on the body of concepts his works cover with as much pen-
etration or lasting significance. So, I proceed in the belief that if I’ve man-
aged to capture what can respectably be presented as a Wittgensteinian
position on the subject of visual argumentation, that it is worthy of consid-
eration by those who take visual argumentation seriously.
2. Pictures and picturing in the Blue and Brown Books
Picturing, for Wittgenstein, is different from meaning, different from form-
ing an image, and altogether different from the application of a rule or a
criterion. Time and again, Wittgenstein warns us away from the error mis-
taking picturing for any of these things. In fact, the earliest mention of pic-
turing in the Blue Book comes in the form of a negative example. In the
context of telling us what does not happen when, in making an utterance,
we mean something, Wittgenstein offers the example of uttering a sentence
while holding in the mind a corresponding picture of what it says. While
“such cases and similar ones exist”, he tells us, “they are not at all what
happens as a rule when we say something and mean it, or mean something
else.” (Wittgenstein, 1960) The majority of the substantive occurrences of
the metaphor of pictures or picturing in the Notebooks keeps with this theme,
as when, ten pages later in the same work Wittgenstein refers to the notion
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that the expression of facts must conform to pictures embedded in language
as a bias. Consider also this passage from the Brown Book:
“... we may think that when we look at our drawing and see it as a face, we
compare it with some paradigm, and it agrees with it, or it fits into a
mould ready for it in our mind. But no such mould or conception enters
into our experience, there is only this shape, not any other to compare it
with, and as it were, say “Of course” to. As when in putting together a jig-
saw puzzle, somewhere a small space is left unfilled and I see a piece
obviously fitting it and put it in the place saying to myself “Of course”.
But here we say “Of course” because the piece fits the mould, whereas in
our case of seeing the drawing as a face, we have the same attitude for no
reason.” (Wittgenstein 1960: 166)1
The notion of “fitting” here, and its phenomenological associate, the “of
course” feeling, have a familiar analog in argumentation in the ready man-
ner in which even those with no training can complete patterns of logical
inference. When presented with the hoary old example of the syllogism:
1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
3. Therefore__.”
Almost no one has trouble drawing the conclusion as the missing piece
of the “jigsaw puzzle” and with the requisite feeling: “Of course Socrates is
mortal”. One need not restrict this consideration to deductive arguments
either. Consider whether or not the case would not be substantially similar
with this argument:
1. 98% of widgets produced at factory ABC between June and August
of last year have been shown to be defective.
2. This is a widget produced at factory ABC between June and August of
last year.
3. Therefore__.
1 This passage also marks the appearance of “seeing as” in the Blue and Brown Books. I
shall have more to say about this very important theme later on in the paper.
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Despite the fact that the argument here is not a deductive argument, the
pattern-completion task involved here will proceed in much the same way
and, it is reasonable to think, with a similar margin of success. We could
perhaps attempt a similar move with various argument schemes, such as
appeal to authority or argument from sign.2  It is perhaps the fact that they
provide us with a familiar sort of pattern-completion task that makes us
want to think of them as schemes at all. Like Wittgenstein’s puzzle pieces,
there is a way the reasons fit together that allows us to place the “final piece”,
the conclusion, such that it “fits” too.
The important point for our purposes here is that Wittgenstein, in the
quote above, is denying that this happens with the resolution of the ele-
ments of a picture into to something recognizable, like a face. The phenom-
enological aspect of recognition–which we also have when we fit the puzzle
piece into its space, or see that we can do so from its shape and the shape of
the gap in the nearly-completed puzzle–is present, but unlike the case with
the puzzle, the recognition of the picture has, in his view, no grounding in
reason. But then how does this recognition work? As with the understand-
ing of musical themes, Wittgenstein’s speculation is that the understanding
of a picture works linguistically: “...in the same way I may say “Now I un-
derstand the expression of this face”, and what happened when the under-
standing came was that I found the word which seemed to sum it up.”
(Wittgenstein 1960: 167) This statement is fascinating for a number of rea-
sons, not the least of which is the reversal of roles it envisions in compari-
son to the doctrine of the Tractatus. It’s wider significance notwithstand-
ing, for purposes of this article the chief interest of this statement is that
makes the understanding of pictures dependent upon associating them with
words. To understand a picture, then, is to be able to translate it out of the
realm of image and into the realm of the verbal, into language. While he
may indeed depart from the picture theory of meaning, at no point does
Wittgenstein abandon the thesis, first advanced in the Tractatus, that think-
ing happens in the medium of language. It is plausible that his desire to
preserve this thesis in the face of the challenges presented by the inten-
tional vocabulary (the vocabulary of wishing that, hoping that, expecting
2 A thorough, if possibly not exhaustive, accounting of a great many of these schemes
can be found in Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008).
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that, etc.) is a motivating factor for many of the theses of the Notebooks and
Philosophical Investigations.3  I now turn to Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philo-
sophical Investigations.
3. Pictures and Picturing in Philosophical Investigations
Philosophical Investigations (hereafter PI, for brevity’s sake) is riddled with
references to pictures and picturing, but there are four portions of this work
in particular that are of special importance for the topic of visual argumen-
tation. These are passages 139b-140, 422-427, 300-302 and all of Part II,
section xi. Because of their individual importance I will treat each of these
sections individually. I will treat them in this order for the sake of clarity of
exposition.
3.1. PI 139b-140
PI 139b-140, in many ways, could be seen as starting where Wittgenstein’s
remarks in the Blue and Brown Books leave off:
139(b). “I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path
leaning on a stick.–How? Might it not have looked just the same if he
had been sliding downhill in that position? Perhaps a Martian might de-
scribe the picture so. I do not need to explain why we do not describe it so.”
140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should like to
express by saying: I thought the picture forced a particular use on me?
How could I think that? What did I think? Is there such a thing as a
picture, or something like a picture, that forces a particular application
on us; so that my mistake lie in confusing one picture with another?–For
we might also be inclined to express ourselves like this: we are at most
under a psychological, not a logical, compulsion. [...] [T]here are other
processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should be
3 I owe this point to the late Barbara Humphries.
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prepared to call “applying the picture of a cube”. So our ‘belief that the
picture forced a particular application on us’ consisted in the fact that only
the one case and no other occurred to us.” (Wittgenstein 1968, 54-5)4
The clear linkage between these passages and the remarks from the Note-
books are their emphasis on the extra-logical, psychological or phenom-
enological nature of picturing. As the image of 139(b) suggests, even a simple
picture can suggest multiple, equally respectable understandings of what it
represents. Is the man moving up the hill or down it?5  Many commenta-
tors, including Fodor (1975), have taken 139(b) in the spirit of the Brown
Book quote given in the previous section and held it to be saying that the
picture must be translated into language in order for us to know whether
the man is moving up or down the incline of the hill. Perhaps an obvious
next step–certainly one that Wittgenstein, on some readings, would have
been happy with–is to say that this is also true of words and sentences.6
And it is true, but only to a point, and only in certain sorts of instances. To
see why we have to consider the point Wittgenstein is making in these two
passages in the context of the work as a whole.
The ways in which we might interpret a sentence are bounded by the
sentence’s being embedded in the rule-governed, communal activity of lan-
guage. The conditions under which a sentence, uttered by a speaker, will be
intelligible to an audience of the same linguistic community restrict the pos-
sible meanings of the sentence. Importantly, these conditions restrict not
just the meanings that the audience is likely to “take away” from the speaker’s
utterance, but the meanings that the speaker may coherently intend by what
he says. That said, it must be allowed that, as Wittgenstein puts it in 140,
neither words nor pictures “force a particular application” upon us. The larger
4 Note that the mention of “applying the picture of a cube” refers to an earlier example
of the same sort of problem.
5 We could perhaps alleviate some of the strangeness of Wittgenstein’s image, and bet-
ter appreciate his point, by imagining that there is an escalator slightly hidden from our
view or by replacing the path with a staircase set into a hill in a park which the man might
either be walking up or cautiously backing down.
6 Koethe (1996) provides one example of such a view. It is important to note that saying
that Wittgenstein’s views in the Philosophical Investigations exhibit continuity with those
in the Tractatus does not commit one to saying that he did not change his views substan-
tially over time–especially about the picture theory of the latter work. This point is well
argued in Ellis (1978).
“A picture held us Captive”: The later Wittgenstein... / S. W. PATTERSON
112
COGENCY  Vol. 2,  N0. 2,  Spring 2010
point that Wittgenstein is trying to make here, and in similar places through-
out the later works, is just that it is a mistake to understand the semantics of
any particular word in terms of a rigid and necessessitarian ontology asso-
ciated with it. Were we to do so we would be, as he says, “mistaking a psy-
chological compulsion for a logical one”.
It would be tempting to take from this the lesson that pictures and words
are on a par with one another, but Wittgenstein’s remarks here and else-
where, as we shall see, make clear that this is a mistake. Words may be like
pictures in that they do not of themselves force a use, but the similarity ends
there. Whereas rules and communal criteria of meaning keep us from fall-
ing into humpty-dumptyism with language, there are no such checks on
picturing, or if there are, their effectiveness falls far short of those accompa-
nying our usage of language.
3.2. PI 422-427
These passages occur in the context of Wittgenstein’s examination of the
language used to talk about states of consciousness, the vocabulary he some-
times describes as “psychical” and that some commentators have called the
intentional vocabulary. As we shall see, they support the view of pictures
developed in 193(b) and 194. Begin by considering the text of 422-3:
422. What am I believing in when I believe that men have souls? What
am I believing in, when I believe that this substance contains two carbon
rings? In both cases there is the picture in the foreground, but the sense
lies far in the background; that is, the application of the picture is not
easy to survey.
423. Certainly, all these things happen in you.–And now all I ask is to
understand the expression we use. –The picture is there, and I am not
disputing its validity in any particular case. –Only I also want to under-
stand the application of the picture. (Wittgenstein 1968: 126)
In terms of pictures, 422 continues the notion of 193-4. Pictures, unlike
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words, are harder to apply owing to their not being embedded within a com-
munal system of rules and criteria. The image can be apt, it can give us a
sense of “fitting” experience or an idea–but it does not by itself tell us “how
to go on”. This crucial difference between aptness and application is rein-
forced by Wittgenstein’s emphatic repetition of it in the first half of 424:
“The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But what is its
application?” The contrast in these passages is really between the intuitive
apprehension of a state of affairs–the way things appear to one–and the
sort of grasp of a state of affairs that allows us to draw conclusions from it,
to know its place among the relationships that hold between other articles
of knowledge or belief. The “correctness” of a picture mentioned in 424 then
is a felt correctness, an intuitive sense of the rightness of the idea held be-
fore the mind. It is not a logical correctness, with which we might reason-
ably hope to develop a more detailed account of the phenomenon under
consideration. This, I suspect, is what is puzzling to Wittgenstein about ideas
of the “psychical”. They “feel” right–sometimes because they arise from fa-
miliar expressions of speech, and perhaps sometimes as a purely phenom-
enological matter–but we cannot justifiably do anything with them that we
can ordinarily do with conceptions whose sense we can workout within the
framework provided by language.7  Hence the inherent lack of application
in pictures. Pictures simply confront us in a brute, or at least a non-rational
way.8  They do not tell us the way to go forward, and in fact they may hinder
us from doing so. This is why we must beware of their ability to “hold us
captive” (PI 115); because it “stands in the way of our seeing the use of the
word as it is” (PI 305).
7 The pragmatic considerations implied here ought not to be taken lightly. They run
through PI 107, 202, 206, and 241 to name just a few passages. On this theme in Wittgenstein
and its significance see also C. A. van Peursen (1959).
8 I specifically use the word ‘non-rational’ here, and not ‘irrational’, because recent de-
velopments in cognitive science suggest that human reasoning is a composite of both ratio-
nal activities roughly correlated with activity in the frontal and parietal lobes of the brain,
and the older, emotional system of cognition correlated prominently with the amygdala and
other structures. To say therefore that something is non-rational is not to mark it off as not
being reasoning of a type. It is simply to say that it is not logical reasoning as that sort of
reasoning has traditionally been understood.
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3.3. PI 300-302
So far the following point has emerged about Wittgenstein’s notion of pic-
turing: To picture something is for one to have an experience of a particular
quality, an experience not unlike a sudden realization but of a non-logical
(and perhaps in some instances potentially misleading) variety. The experi-
ence is not unlike that of the slave boy in Plato’s Meno upon being led to the
solution of the geometry puzzle by Socrates. (Plato 2002) He is struck by
the impression that the solution is correct, but it would be impossible for
him to explain why it is correct, or to apply the process by which the solu-
tion was reached to a new problem. Though he has the answer, he does not
grasp it in a way that would give him, in Wittgenstein’s parlance, the appli-
cation of the answer. Without this application, the boy would be unable to
tell us whether he had learned something about squares, or how to draw the
diagonal of any figure, or geometry in general, or dialectic in general or about
any or all of these. He would be in the same position as the interpreter of the
picture in 139(b)–assured of his impression that the man is going uphill,
but without any grounds for being so assured. To picture something, then,
is not to experience a recognition of the sort that we have when we grasp a
mathematical or logical rule, or the application of such a rule to a particular
case. It is to fix the mind on a particular aspect of what is seen–not for rea-
sons, but because “it just feels right” to do so. It is to have, if this is not too
much of a strain on both of these words, an epistemic feeling.
It would be understandable if someone were to resist this conclusion,
holding instead that in at least some cases, what is happening in picturing is
the intuitive grasp of a concept. To give in to this temptation, however rea-
sonable it may seem on first blush, would be mistaken. This is the point of
the distinction between images and pictures that Wittgenstein draws in PI
300-302. It is highly significant that Wittgenstein draws this distinction via
the relationship of each to language games. This reinforces the notion that
has been emerging throughout this essay that for Wittgenstein, pictures must
be put into language before they epistemic feelings they engender can ripen
into understanding, or at least usability. Consider the following, from PI 300:
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300. [...] It is a misunderstanding to say that the picture of pain enters
into the language game with the word “‘pain’.” The image of pain is not a
picture, and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by any-
thing that we should call a picture.–The image of pain certainly enters
into the language game in a sense; only not as a picture. (1968: 101)
In terms of the example from the Meno, this is to say that there is a
concept the boy could grasp (let us say the concept of the diagonal) and the
Socratic process he has been subjected to points him in the right direction,
but be that as it may, the boy does not yet grasp the concept–he does not yet
have the image of the diagonal before his mind. What he has is a picture, an
epistemic feeling that something is the case, not a well-defined concept that
he could apply to other problems in geometry. The image of the diagonal is
present in the Socratic dialogue (a sort of language game) used to lead the
boy to the solution of the puzzle, but it is clear that this image is more than
just an epistemic feeling about the correctness of the solution to the prob-
lem. Hence Wittgenstein’s claim that the image is not replaceable by the
picture in the language-game makes sense, as does what might otherwise
seem to be the cryptic delivery of PI 301, “An image is not a picture, but a
picture can correspond to it.” Wittgenstein’s continued insistence that we
must not mistake pictures for images or for understanding of the sort we
can apply, then, is a caution against taking the feeling that one is right for
one’s actually being right. It isn’t that pictures are never veridical, it is that
they are unevenly and unpredictably so. Sometimes our pictures do turn
out to be right (in these cases they do correspond to an image), but far too
often, he warns us, our feeling that we are right is just a chimera. It is this
unpredictable nature which Wittgenstein has in mind in his repeated insis-
tence that pictures do not give us application and that this makes them ill-
suited to be bearers of meaning or part of the processes of cognition. In
order to be either of those things there needs be a public framework of ex-
isting patterns of interpretation, and this is precisely what pictures (unlike
images or concepts) do not have. “Hence”, Wittgenstein himself writes later
in Section xi of Part II of PI, “the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual
experience, half thought.” (1968: 197) It is to Section xi that I now turn.
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3.4. “Seeing as”: PI Part II, xi
One way of thinking about what partisans of visual argumentation ask us to
do is to think of it as enticing us to see visual images as argumentation, or
alternatively, to notice those aspects of images that are argumentative in na-
ture. The process by which we do this would clearly be a form of “seeing as” or
“noticing an aspect”, so it will behoove us to have some idea of Wittgenstein’s
treatment of this notion.
Interestingly, Wittgenstein illustratively deploys a number of images in
his account of “seeing as”, perhaps most famously the Jastrow duck-rabbit
image, a version of which is pictured in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Duck-Rabbit Illusion (Jastrow 1899).
The phenomenon of “seeing as” is one in which a person’s visual percep-
tion undergoes a shift between two (or perhaps more) modes. In the case of
the duck-rabbit the two modes are obvious. One may see the image as a
duck or as a rabbit. Wittgenstein’s purpose in presenting the image is to say
something about interpretation and how it differs from perception.9  The
key point here is that interpretation is not a matter of having an “inner pic-
ture” in response to the visual image with which one is presented. The temp-
tation to think that it is is due to the ease with which we find it satisfying to
say, of illusions like the duck-rabbit, that one may interpret the figure as a
duck (in which case one forms the inner picture of a duck when looking at
9 In my treatment of “seeing as” I follow the analysis of Seligman (1976).
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the image) or that one may interpret the figure as a rabbit (in which case
one forms the inner picture of a rabbit when looking at the image). Why is
this problematic? Seligman, drawing on an earlier account by Aldrich, ex-
plains it this way:
All that this talk of inner pictures seems to get us is now two ‘private’
pictures–one, the ‘pure visual content’ and the other the ‘interpreted
mental content’. And now we are worse off than before. Where we at
least had criteria for what constitutes an interpretation, we are now faced
with an image of such a mysterious sort that we cannot isolate any unique
criteria for its presence or absence. The only criteria is what we say, and
what we say is exactly what we would say if the object itself had actually
altered. (Seligman 1976: 211)
The problem, of course, is that the object hasn’t altered in the slightest.
Seligman continues:
Wittgenstein has tried to rule out in his characteristic fashion, explana-
tions of the concept of “seeing” and “seeing as” which appeal to ‘inner
pictures’ or private images. [...] The objective was to give the lie to any
philosophical theories which might rest upon a notion of seeing which
requires a ‘pure visual element’ and an accompanying element of ‘inter-
pretation’. In the cases of seeing-as where such a two-element theory of
seeing seems most at home it fails. And Wittgenstein’s point seems to be
that if it will not work here, it will not work at all. (Seligman 1976: 212)
So “seeing as” is not a matter of interpretation. What is it then? For clearly
something is going on when we consider the shift engendered by images
like the duck-rabbit. Seligman, following Wittgenstein’s remarks about the
image of a Necker cube a proposes that to “see the image as” is to have the
capacity to form counterfactual contexts in which to locate the various as-
pects it appears to take on, for example to see the cube as if from above, or
as if from below. We need not do this in every case, says Seligman, it is
enough for the seeing of an aspect that we could do it. This is not as puzzling
a notion as it may seem, for it returns us to the Brown Book notion of “fit”
with which we began the investigation into picturing. To see an aspect is
phenomenologically similar to the “puzzle-piece” epistemic feeling gener-
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ated by the aptness of an image, but unlike the puzzle piece, which we fit
into a context, seeing an aspect is like understanding how to fit the other
pieces around a piece that we have decided to use for an anchor. It is, as
Seligman puts it, “a kind of ‘knowing one’s way about’.” The important point
to take away from this notion of “seeing as,” is that to see a visual image as
having a particular aspect is not to pull out a hidden signification that lies
within it, the way that a creature’s DNA lies within its cells. It is to attach a
significance to the image through the positing of counterfactuals that frame
the image in such a way as to make it possible for us to explain to others the
aspect we ourselves see.
This completes the sketch of Wittgenstein’s notion of picturing. Though
undoubtedly there is a great deal more to say about such matters, the sketch
in its present form should suffice for purposes of application to the question
of whether or not there can be purely visual arguments.
4. Picturing, Visual Arguments, and Visual Argumentation
It shall be my contention in this portion of the paper to show that while no
one has yet satisfactorily shown that there are visual arguments, this does
not rule out the possibility that visual images can be elements of argumen-
tation.10  The account of picturing left to us by Wittgenstein, I shall content,
can shed some light as to why this is. Because visual argumentation theo-
ries are so varied I cannot address them all, so I shall here confine myself to
two of the better-known accounts of recent years, the interesting and very
different theories put forward by the team of David Birdsell and Leo Groarke,
and that of Christina Slade.
4.1. Birdsell and Groarke
Perhaps the best known view of visual argument is that provided by Birdsell
and Groarke (1996, 2002). As is well known Birdsell and Groarke quite ex-
10 In this I am siding, I believe, with Blair (1996), though perhaps in a different way and
for different reasons.
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plicitly contend that theirs is a theory of visual argument “in the traditional
premise and conclusion sense”. (Birdsell and Groarke 2007: 106) Though
their theory is well worked out and contains a number of components, I
wish here primarily to focus on their contention that there are such things
as “visual propositions”. The reason for this is that it seems to me this con-
tention is necessary for a theory of visual argument that takes those argu-
ments to be of the traditional sort.
Birdsell and Groarke tell us that “a visual demonstration is inherently
propositional because a visual image is used to convey information that is
purportedly true”. They defend this assertion by calling up the example of a
map which “purports to be an accurate (“true”) representation of the ar-
rangement of places in space”. (2007: 106) The example is clear enough
and the view they advocate is initially plausible, as it seems intuitive to read
at least some visual demonstrations as declarative in their intent, or as
assertives under the theory of speech acts. Certainly the intent of a map is to
assert that “the territory described here is thus and such”. Notice, however,
that the example of the map is one with properties that may not generalize
to all examples–indeed not even to the other examples of visual argumenta-
tion in Groarke and Birdsell’s paper. The conventions around maps and their
use are stable and shared in a way that the conventions around other sorts
of images are not. But this is a minor point. The question at issue is whether
or not visual demonstrations are propositional, generally. Let us consider
this question in the light of the Wittgensteinian analysis of picturing devel-
oped in the first sections of this paper.
In order to be propositional, a visual image would clearly need to be
more than a picture in Wittgenstein’s sense–a visual or imaginary display
capable of eliciting an unjustified but nonetheless strong epistemic feeling.
Recall the example from PI 139b–that of the image of the man half way up
the incline. If visual demonstrations are to be propositional then it seems as
though they should have to be capable of “forcing a use” upon us just as
surely as a linguistic assertion would. They should contain within them-
selves an application that reveals itself in the context of a fund of shared,
public conventions for interpretation, just as the grammatical pattern in a
sentence or the inferential pattern in an argument form does. The feeling of
“fit” we have between the image and the idea expressed should not be idio-
syncratic or merely “psychological”. Can we say this about visual demon-
“A picture held us Captive”: The later Wittgenstein... / S. W. PATTERSON
120
COGENCY  Vol. 2,  N0. 2,  Spring 2010
strations of the sort Birdsell and Groarke take to be examples of arguments?
Certainly Birdsell and Groarke appreciate the importance of context, so
it will be no answer to the question to apply the Wittgensteinian critique to
an image excerpted from the conventions one would use to understand it.
Indeed, for Wittgenstein, context and conventions of interpretation are nec-
essary to understand any utterance of language. If we are to be fair to Birdsell
and Groarke, then we should not stack the deck against visual propositions
by imagining that there aren’t shared funds of symbols and visual conven-
tions we need to be cognizant of when interpreting images. So are there
visual propositions? Even if we grant the existence of the kind of context
Birdsell and Groarke claim, I think the answer has to be no. The principal
reason for this is that the context and the conventions against which we
interpret images are nowhere near as stable as those involved in linguistic
interpretation. To see this, consider the example of the political cartoon
Birdsell and Groarke use as an example of visual argumentation (Figure 2):
Figure 2: Cartoon from Birdsell and Groarke (2007: 108).
It is not insignificant that they give a caption for the image. The caption
they give is “The economy reflected in the White House Press Office’s Magic
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Mirror”. That they give the image a caption is in some ways a cheat.11  The
caption expresses the proposition that the image is supposed to contain it-
self, it contributes a sort of linguistic framing for the interpretation of the
image the importance of which should not be underestimated. Just as we
must not imagine ourselves as visual dunces, we cannot let the language do
the work that the picture is supposed to do if we are to test Birdsell and
Groarke’s theory fairly. Could we work this proposition out simply from the
image itself, absent the caption? It doesn’t seem that we could. A whole host
of problems similar to those in PI 139b would prevent us from doing so.
Even if we were to see this image in its right context, with the knowledge
that it is a newspaper editorial and that the figure in the picture is George
Bush, without the caption a multiplicity of possible interpretations spring
forward. Importantly, the purportedly negative tone of the editorial dissolves
in a bevy of alternative readings of the image. Perhaps Bush, like the frail
boy of the old Charles Atlas bodybuilding ads, is imagining success, and the
image in the mirror reflects not a deluded self-image but a goal towards
which he intends to work with dedication and perseverance. Perhaps he
doesn’t look through a mirror at all, but through a portal at a figure who
represents the body politic–an interpretation supported by the flag on the
figure’s bicep, the dollar sign representing our common goal of prosperity–
which Bush sees himself leading as its metaphorical head, and the two fig-
ures raise their arms in the gesture of boxers emerging victorious from a
hard-fought match. Interpreted in this way the image could seem to say, “I,
one man, am weak, but together we as a nation are strong and shall triumph
over our common challenges.”
Now one could say to these alternative interpretations, “But that’s pre-
posterous!” But why would it be preposterous? As Wittgenstein says of the
image in 139b, it does not matter if no one ever really does draw such inter-
pretations. What matters is that one can do so, and that there seems to be
no rational barrier to doing so that emerges from within the image itself or
the conventions of interpreting images we share. Of course one might draw
the interpretation of the image that Birdsell and Groarke intend, even with-
out the caption, but if one did not then Birdsell and Groarke need to be able
to supply an account of why one would be wrong, or perhaps display a sort
11 Ralph Johnson (2003) makes a similar point against Birdsell and Groarke’s view.
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of incompetence were he to draw a different interpretation than theirs from
the visual image. By Wittgensteinian lights, they need an account of what it
is to misunderstand an image that compares perspicuously with what it is
to misunderstand a linguistic utterance. If there is no such account to be
found, as I suspect there is not, then visual images are like Wittgenstein’s
pictures. By themselves images may spur cognitive feelings or associations–
and so may be persuasive–but they lack an internal pattern, the recognition
of which would allow them to be the presentation of an illative move from
premises to conclusion. Hence they do not seem to carry propositional con-
tent other than that which is assigned to them or framed by the caption
(and what is a caption, but set of directions for how to interpret the im-
age).12  And if images on their own are not propositional, then visual images
cannot be arguments of the sort that Birdsell and Groarke contend.
Smith (2007) has suggested a path that seems as if it might avoid this
objection. According to Smith, the ability to draw at least one possible read-
ing of the image that qualities as an argument is enough to say that the
image contains an argument. Quoting Birdsell and Groarke’s (1996: 8) ex-
ample of holding cake under a dieter’s nose as a way of arguing that he should
eat it she says: “This example illustrates enthymematic argument as I con-
ceive it. Multiple interpretations are possible, some of which can be consid-
ered arguments for the dieter to consider.” (Smith 2007: 119) Birdsell and
Groarke might wish to say something like this as well. As long as one inter-
pretation of the image reads it as a proposition then they are safe. However,
this move does not succeed. For, Birdsell and Groarke must now hold that
every picture admits of a set of interpretations some one of which is propo-
sitional in the way required for their to be an argument. The 139b problem
remains: which interpretation is it and why should we treat with it rather
than any of the others at any given instance. Why would we be wrong if we
did not do so? And if, as I suggest in the next section, the propositional
12 An appreciation of the significance of this problem of relating the sign to the signified
in Wittgenstein’s works in both its logical and phenomenological dimensions can be found
in Munson (1962).
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interpretation will be as much the product of the way we frame the image in
language as the product of the elements of the image, then how are we jus-
tified in saying that the image contains the argument we construct out of it?
A similar line of objection applies, mutatis mutandis, to Smith’s contention
that images are enthymematic arguments.
But perhaps that’s not so bad. Why imagine that visual argumentation is
propositional in the first place? Why not imagine visual argumentation as a
complex semiotic phenomenon in which symbols and associations, but not
propositions, are leveraged to produce a belief in the mind of the onlooker?
Other parts of Birdsell and Groarke’s theory gesture in this direction. Chris-
tina Slade’s account of the argumentation contained in advertising is fun-
damentally of this variety. It is to her account that I now turn.
4.2. Slade
Christina Slade’s account (2003) of visual argumentation focuses on adver-
tising. She contends that at least some ads contain argumentation that is
“purely visual”. Her leading example in this paper is a television ad for
“Bond’s Cottontails”, a sort of women’s undergarments. The ad itself, as
Slade describes it, is not a purely visual ad but contains elements of text,
both spoken and written. In her case for the “purely visual” argumentation
in the ad, however, Slade goes out of her way to deal only with the images at
work. Whether or not this strategy can evade the same sort of problem
Birdsell and Groarke have with captions is an open question. The original
television ad, one assumes, occurred in a relatively brief interval of time
and with a blending of textual, visual, and musical elements that would make
it difficult to pull any one element out of the overall gestalt and say that it
functions separably from any or all of the others. Not having seen the ad
myself I will not pursue this question further, but simply note it for those
who have and move on. For purposes of what follows I shall simply accept
Slade’s implicit assumption that the visuals are separable from the whole to
a degree that makes the drawing of argumentation from them alone a plau-
sible analytical enterprise.
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Whereas Birdsell and Groarke contend that there are visual arguments
of the premise-conclusion variety, Slade’s overall view of visual argumenta-
tion is a blend of different elements. This makes her claim that there are
visual arguments importantly different from theirs. Orienting the reader to
her view of argumentation, Slade says the following:
Fleming and Blair are correct to maintain that the paradigm of argu-
mentation is verbal. Indeed, there would and could not be argumenta-
tion in a society without language. Argumentation is essentially dialogi-
cal, and hence is based on verbal disputation. However it does not follow
that analogical forms of argumentation may not exist in visual images –
particularly when the conventions surrounding the meaning of visual
images of a certain type mean that the images are read as arguments. Ad-
vertisements are the prime example of visual argumentation precisely be-
cause they are conventionally read as persuasive images. (Slade 2003: 148)
From this quote we may gather that Slade’s concept of visual argumen-
tation centers on the idea of the persuasive image. The persuasive image is
not held to be an argument in Birdsell and Groarke’s “classic premise and
conclusion sense”, but only analogically in comparison with dialogical no-
tions of argumentation, the key ground of similarity apparently being the
convention-based nature of our ability to read something as an argument.
When we are presented with advertising, Slade contends, we expect argu-
mentation so it stands to reason that in visual media we expect visual argu-
mentation. If Slade’s argument from analogy holds up, and if her account of
the conventions within which meaning is garnered from visual images holds
up, then she will have what Birdsell and Groarke don’t have–a way of telling
us, reliably, when visual argumentation is present and how to read it cor-
rectly. The whole case turns on Slade’s account of the conventions involved.
Slade draws her analytical conventions for images from Kress and Van
Leeuwen’s system of “visual metafunctions”. Their framework for image
analysis, as adapted by Slade and applied to her central example, runs along
the lines indicated in Table 1.
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From the analysis of the image thus generated, Slade extracts the fol-
lowing argument:
1. People who wear cottontails look to the future. (from the narrative ide-
ational element, textual element, and the context of the ad as an ad for
cottontails)
2. If you want to move into the future, you should wear Bond’s cottontails.
(from premise 1)
3. You want to move into the future. (implied by the interpersonal element)
4. It follows that You should wear Bond’s cottontails. (from premises 2 & 3,
by modus ponens)
5. It further follows that, if you do not wear Bond’s cottontails, and they
can be bought, you should buy Bond’s cottontails. (practical implica-
tions of premise 4) (Slade 2003: 150)13
Kress and Van Leeuwen
Metafunction Name
Narrative Ideational
Conceptual Ideational
Textual
Interpersonal
Analytical
Significance
Explains the story told
by the image.
Explains the analysis
given by the image.
Gives the meaning of
the compositional
elements of the image.
Explains the position in
which the image places
the viewer.
Table 1: Application of Slade’s Image Analysis Rubric to the Cottontails Advertisement.
Application to Slade’s
Cottontails Ad Example
The image tells the story of
the girl’s transition from more
to less conservative attitudes
about sexuality and woman-
hood.
The image analyzes woman-
hood as being more complex
than just apparent conformity
to social norms.
The movement of the image
suggests movement towards
the future.
The viewer is put in the
position of covetous spectator
who looks on as the woman
undergoes her transforma-
tion, and desires a similar
transformation herself.
13 I have elided some of Slade’s inter-premise text and added the parenthetical elements
to allow the logic of Slade’s extracted and reconstructed argument to stand out.
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This is a very impressive analysis, and one that seems to provide us with
criteria from getting from the image to the proposition in a fairly stable
way. Given Slade’s contention that Blair and Fleming operate on too nar-
row a conception of argumentation it is striking that Slade produces as her
demonstration of an argument embedded in a purely visual medium an ar-
gument that would satisfy the conception of argumentation they use. As a
response to Blair and Fleming, it is a sound strategy in that it shows that
visual argumentation can be found that meets even their (on her view, overly)
strict conception of the argumentation involved. What is striking about it is
that she generates this argument by the application of semiotic principles of
interpretation that are supposed to be operative at the level of argumenta-
tion seen not as premise-conclusion argumentation, but as a dynamical in-
terchange involving more than just that sort of argument. Regardless of what
the Wittgensteinian perspective says about the possibility of visual argu-
mentation of the sort Slade suggests, the connection her view displays be-
tween the wider and narrower senses of argumentation, I think, retains its
force and its interest.
Despite the appearance presented by her key example, Slade makes no
claim that images can be propositional. Were she to say that, all the same
points that count against the Birdsell and Groarke analysis would count
against hers as well. Since she does not explicitly make that claim, let us
simply leave the matter at that. The Wittgensteinian notion of “seeing as”
will prove to be far more relevant to the evaluation of her case for purely vi-
sual arguments. To return to this purpose let us now ask, does Slade’s view
fare any better than Birdsell and Groarke’s on Wittgensteinian criteria?
Recall that “seeing as” was not a process of extracting a hidden meaning
in an image. It was not a matter of interpretation, of revealing what the
image says. Rather, “seeing as” is a matter of adopting a particular attitude
towards an image, expressible in terms of counterfactual statements, that
permits the person seeing the image to see it in a certain way (e.g. now as a
duck, now as a rabbit). The question of whether the attitude thus taken pro-
vides access to something unequivocally communicated by the image itself
is moot. The connection between this perspective of “seeing as” and the in-
determinacy of interpretation suggested by PI 139b should be clear. What
an image “says” is largely going to be a matter of what the viewer brings to it
in terms of contextual knowledge and cultural or linguistic framing. This,
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however, should not make us think that we need to be relativists about the
meaning of images. On this point Gill’s recommendation is apt:
The only alternative to the “cult of objectivity” is not relativistic subjec-
tivism. A more viable line of approach is to recognize that we live in a
conversation among the personal, the social, and the physical dimen-
sions of reality, and that each of these dimensions exerts its pull upon us
in a specific historical context. As human beings we struggle to maintain
our balance in this constantly fluctuating situation, and because of indi-
vidual and cultural differences we do this ins somewhat different ways.
We find different models or metaphors by means of which to chart our
courses. Nevertheless, there are certain commonalities which comprise
the human form of life and which may be thought of as forming the bed-
rock or touchstone for evaluating the overall worth of our chosen mod-
els. (Gill 1979: 283)
The objection being made to Slade’s analysis here, then, is not that it is
just her subjective reading of the images in question. She might have very
good reasons, after all, for thinking that the image says what she says it
does. Rather, the objection is simply that Slade’s account takes images to do
something that they cannot do, to be something they cannot be, on their
own, that is, be bearers of hidden interpretations that viewers must unlock
correctly if they are to grasp the “one true meaning” of the image. If we need
such a complicated conceptual or semiotic apparatus to extract the argu-
mentation from an advertisement, then the argumentation we find within it
cannot be, as she claims, “purely visual”. The presence of the argumenta-
tion in the Bond’s Cottontails ad, then, is less a matter of the visuals them-
selves than it is of the framework of analysis we bring to it. Can we see the
visuals in the ad as an argument? Absolutely we can. Is the argument really
there within the image? This is a question which Wittgenstein would likely
have regarded as unanswerable, perhaps malformed. It is like asking, of the
Jastrow duck-rabbit, “Which is it, duck or rabbit?” and demanding a final
answer. It is like asserting that seeing the Necker cube “from above” is the
way in which the image calls upon us to see it, not “from below”.
The upshot of all this is that the argumentation of an image is constructed
around it, not implicit with in it somehow. Drawing a conclusion from an
image, then is unlike drawing a conclusion from linguistic premises in that
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there is no implicit pattern of reasoning that the recipient of the argumen-
tation recognizes and completes. This would be a case of genuinely com-
pleting a puzzle by fitting the last piece in. With “visual arguments” the case
is different; the argumentation is constructed around the image to make
use of its rhetorical impact. The important difference here is that the pro-
cess in a visual argument involves not the recognition of a pattern of rea-
soning but a stipulation of the reading that the arguer wants the audience to
draw from the image. This is part of the reason why Wittgenstein calls the
recognition of a face a psychological, not a rational event and why, on his
view, we can at most only experience an epistemic feeling of correctness
with respect to visual images, but never a sense of logical correctness. This
is also why no argument in favor of visual arguments will ever be given in
images alone without any accompanying text. The textual accompaniment
is a sine qua non. Either it will point us directly to the arguer’s intended
proposition, as the caption on Birdsell and Groarke’s cartoon does, or it will
close off alternative interpretations by stipulating a method by which the im-
age must be understood if the argumentation is to be revealed, as Slade’s analy-
sis does. Whichever method is chosen, the result is the same: the arguer di-
rects the audience to that reading of the image (of the many that there are)
that she wishes to use in her argumentation. For those who wish to make use
of the indisputable power of visual elements in their argumentation, this re-
striction of readings is absolutely necessary owing to the open-textured na-
ture of visual meaning. The image then functions not as a piece of argumenta-
tion itself–indeed it cannot–but as a kind of locus of argumentation.
5. Conclusion: Of Apples and Arguments
Slade, and Birdsell and Groarke, are partially right: images are persuasive.
But not everything that persuades is an argument, and that applies to visual
images. When one is persuaded by argumentation that contains images,
like Slade’s cottontails ad or Birdsell and Groarke’s political cartoon, what
persuades is not an argument that lurks within the image in such a way as to
subconsciously or otherwise register with one’s rational faculties. What per-
suades is the “total package” of argumentation (argumentation in Slade’s
wide sense) within which the visual image is nestled. It is the surrounding
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argumentation that frames the image in such a way that one can see it as a
part of the argumentation too. The work that that the visual image does
therein may vary, but it can do work. The mistake, by Wittgensteinian lights,
simply lies in thinking that because an image does some work in argumen-
tation it thereby becomes an argument. Whatever else it can do, the visual
image cannot do this. This is largely owing to three reasons: 1) images, though
they are productive of epistemic feelings in us, do not lead us to conclusions
by rational means, 2) even if we allow for contextual influences on interpre-
tation, images always allow the drawing of multiple valid readings between
which there is no a priori method of adjudication, and 3) the business of
“seeing an image as__” is more a business of erecting a conceptual scaffold-
ing around it for the purpose of arriving at a particular reading of it than it is
of unlocking a fixed but hidden meaning lying within it. This is why, for
Wittgenstein, it is a bad thing if “a picture holds us captive” with respect to
our efforts to determine the meaning of a word or expression, and why we
need a community of language users playing the same (or similar enough)
language games by the same (or a similar enough) system of rules in order
to speak meaningfully of the meaning of a word or expression.
It would be easy for someone to take the remark that pictures are less
bound by rules of interpretation than words as a sort of slur, as what George
Roque (2009) has called “linguistic imperialism”. If this is an implication of
Wittgenstein’s view, the anti-linguistic-imperialist might say, then so much
the worse for Wittgenstein. But I think this would be a mistake, for in
Wittgenstein’s view is a tacit acknowledgement of the power of images that
the visual argumentation theorist should find salutary. Images may not con-
tain arguments on this view, but this does not mean that images are inferior
to words. In fact, I would argue that it is the other way ‘round. It is the
semantic polyvalence of images, their ability to carry multiple meanings and
interpretations; the different ways in which we may see them that gives
images their power. And, I would hasten to add, it is not as though there are
no boundaries to the interpretation of images, that some ways of seeing (as
with some ways of speaking) are not perhaps more accurate than others.
The quotation from Gill to the effect that the open-textured nature of im-
ages need not collapse into a relativism about them given in the last section
of the paper is one worth keeping in mind.
Consider, for example, a still life painting by Cézanne (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Cézanne, “Still Life with Apples, Pears, and a Gray Jug” 1893-1894.
Looked at in a certain way, this painting is rather mundane. It is a simple
representation of ordinary objects in an ordinary setting. Looked at in an-
other way, Cézanne’s apples are a call to revolution in painting. In order to
see them in this way, however, one must first understand painting as it was
practiced at the time Cézanne was painting. One must also understand the
fundamentals of painting and, more generally, of two-dimensional design.
Cézanne’s apples certainly say something to those who understand these
things, and they say it elegantly and forcefully. However, it is not mistaken
to see the painting as a pleasant, if somewhat oddly executed, picture of
fruit in a bowl. It is not mistaken to see the painting as a call to painters in
specific and to people in general to attend to the subjectivity of the act of
seeing itself. Similarly, it is not mistaken to see the argument as a political
comment on the role of farmers in French political life, or a religious medi-
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tation on temptation (Cézanne was, until the time of his death a devout
Roman Catholic). One need not assume that any such statement is being
made at all. The painting may sensibly be interpreted as an exercise in com-
position or color theory and appreciated as such, without any sort of con-
nection to “deeper” or more hidden meanings. Who knows that this isn’t
what Cézanne intended in the first place, and that he wouldn’t chuckle at
highly intellectual attempts to infuse his works with meanings that reach
beyond what the images themselves portray by nestling them within a highly
complicated semiotic architecture? Maybe he just painted for the challenge
of developing his technique, without thinking very deeply about subject
matter at all (though I feel compelled to say that that seems highly doubtful
to me). Sadly, he is no longer with us, and we cannot know for certain what
meaning he intended to communicate in the vast majority of his works. All
of those mentioned are latent possibilities and it is impossible to say that
Cézanne would have been unhappy with any of them or that he would have
intended some and not others, even if his primary purpose was to say some-
thing about painting to other painters.
Visual images are such that the agent who makes them can intend mul-
tiple understandings, or simply intend that viewers reach some reading of
the images she presents. This open-textured nature is the power of images,
not their handicap.14  An argument over what Cézanne’s painting means
would thus have to be open-textured too. An argument over the meaning of
the sentence ‘The cat is on the mat.’, by contrast, is far less open to alterna-
tive readings that do not do violence to communally held standards of inter-
pretation and meaning. One has to leverage the context of the utterance to
extract non-standard accounts of what the statement means, i.e. to assume
that the context of the utterance was in the course of a long poem in which
‘cat’ and ‘mat’ were being used metaphorically. It is not so with the painting.
14 Though the Wittgensteinian diagnosis of the failure of pictures to be arguments on
offer here bears some similarities to that offered in Fleming (1996), it is at the point of
asking what pictures actually do where I suspect the two analyses would cease altogether
running in parallel directions. Fleming spends considerable time on the question of what
pictures actually can and cannot do. In keeping with the notion that images are open-tex-
tured, or semantically polyvalent, I wish simply to say that this fact about them prevents us
from pinning down any one function they might have, sui generis. Though they cannot be
arguments on the analysis given here, the roles that images play in argumentation or per-
suasion may be many and varied indeed.
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The picture provides us with a richness of simultaneous, alternative inter-
pretations of which the word can only dream. But this power comes at a
price, and it is that the semantic polyvalence of images makes them unsuit-
able instruments for tasks requiring more communicative precision. The
image stands on its own. It argues nothing. It is the user of the image who
argues, using it to make or illustrate or emphasize a particular point. In
order to do so, the power of the image has to be diminished. Its expansive-
ness must be closed off and one particular reading privileged over all oth-
ers, at least temporarily, so that it may serve the purposes of the arguer.
Because even when it is so restricted the image has power, this is sometimes
acceptable to do in the service of a conclusion that calls for a particularly
powerful presentation.
It is also reasonable to think that artists, at least sometimes, create works
of art for the purpose of use in arguments. This way of reading what Birdsell
and Groarke’s political cartoonist does, what David intended with “The Death
of Marat” and with him Goya and Picasso (and numerous others) in their
politically inspired works does not force us into treating the visual images
as arguments themselves.15  Even artists who have explicitly political pur-
poses in mind when they make art, however, must bear in mind that it is not
the artwork that argues. It is the person who deploys the artwork in his or
her argumentation who does so. And the person will always need to use
language in addition to artwork–not because the word is more powerful
than the image, but precisely because the image is more powerful than the
word, and must be reined in if it is to serve the arguer’s purpose.
Wittgenstein himself hints at this in PI, II, iv, when in reference to reli-
gious imagery of the soul he says: And haven’t pictures of these things been
painted? And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of
the spoken doctrine? Why should it not do the same service as the words?
And it is the service which is the point.” Were he to have stopped there, the
thesis of this paper would have been untenable. But he did not stop there,
for a few lines down from this quote, the final paragraph of this section
15 Blair’s (1996) treatment of these examples is particularly good, but does not to my
mind establish that these images are arguments, only that they play, or can play, a support-
ing role in a person’s overall campaign of argumentation.
133
reads (the emphasis on the last sentence is mine): “And how about such an
expression as: “In my heart I understood when you said that” pointing to
one’s heart? Does one, perhaps, not mean this gesture? Of course one means
it. Or is one conscious of using a mere figure? Indeed not.–It is not a figure
that we choose, not a simile, yet it is a figurative expression.” (Wittgenstein
1968) It is the words, then, that we use to draw the image into the service of
the argumentation that do the real work in the argument. As I have argued
in this paper, however, Wittgenstein gives us reason to think that things do
not move in the other direction. We can build an argument around an im-
age, but the image itself cannot be said to argue.
Though I have argued here that Wittgenstein gives us reason to think
that visual images cannot be arguments, I do not think he shows that visual
images have no role to play in argumentation more broadly conceived. Nor
do I think that it means that images are somehow “irrational”. I am willing
to go even further than this and say that I think it should be a bad thing if
arguers stopped using visual images as elements of argumentation. Discourse
would be highly impoverished without them, and some points would be very
difficult indeed to make. Wittgenstein himself uses visual images in his ar-
gumentation throughout his works. I have used visual images to make my
points in this paper. And there is nothing hypocritical in either of these us-
ages of images. The rhetorical power that images wield generally, and the
fact that many people more easily process visual information than textual
information makes them indispensable tools of argumentation (and more
broadly, of communication). It simply does not make them arguments.
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